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About a year and a half ago, the ECLA Mexico Office prepareda.note containing f. . 
some considerations on the present situation, and future prospects of the Central 
American economies and the adverse effects which, the critical. situation ¡.through 
which they were passing could have, particularly for the process of, regional 
economic integration.1/*/ A warning: was given on that occasion that the economies 
of the, S'ubregion., both individually,.and as a whole, were beginning to suffer rapid 
deterioration on account of factors of both external and internal origin, and 
that if nothing, was done to deal with this situation it could imperil the level 
of economic interdependence reached through the integration programme, to the 
detriment of one of the relatively autonomous sources pf growth for Central America. 
In order to lessen or even reverse these depressive tendencies» it was proposed 
that machinery should be set up to heighten international collaboration with a 
view to strengthening the activities which the countries of the subregion would have 
to carry out themselves. 
Since then, it has been observed that the situation of the Central American 
economies has deteriorated even more than was foreseen in that note and that 
international co-operation has not played the role which was hoped for. Further-
more, the degree of economic interdependence reached in previous years -measured 
through intra-Central American trade flows- underwent a decline in 1982, partly as 
a reflection of the world recession affecting all the countries of the region to 
different degrees. 
In view of the seriousness of the situation, which combines an economic and 
a political crisis which are without precedents in recent times, and in view of the 
generalized confusion as regards the way to tackle these problems, it has seemed 
appropriate to go more deeply into the causes, characteristics and consequences 
of these crises and to put forward some suggestions regarding possible policy 
options which could be adopted by governments. Although the main emphasis is on 
matters which are the normal concern of the Economic Commission for Latin America, 
topics are also discussed which are not usually dealt with in the Commission's 
.*/.The notes are given at the end of this document. 
/analyses, since 
analyses, sirice it seems impossible to deal with the present economic development 
of the Central American countries without taking account of phenomena which 
correspond to the political and social field. •"' ' 
It is not pretended, ;oi 'btìuWév"'to offèr glbbal' solutions or set models for" 
solving problems of such great complexity. The approach is rather to emphasize '' 
in the first place iltiè bove! na£u*e'o£"'-the' piesent ' crisis!¿̂  && 'ià:"-tìtè-"sécaònd pd'at»-
to formulate soinegtii dé lines which could facilitate the' adaptation of thèse 
countries to thè Changed circumstances insidé and-outside the subregion. Within 
these gùidèïinès, special emphasis iè placed on the activities- whidi; could be 
embarked upon jointly in order tó! bhWck further economic ôetéricfratïeà and'evèri, 
if possible, reverse"'the1 negative1trends Of recent yearsv Thè•èàsénHârpurpose • »' 
wouid be to agree up'bn a programme'bï action aftelr'fostering-a broad debate •" 
withih' each government" and at'the'sàbreglonal level;: 
.' ' ' 'iii'i; 
/I. Introduction 
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v . 1. Introduction ....... . . 
Central America is passing through a profound crisis in-both the economic and the 
political and social spheres: areas so closely interlinked that it would be idle 
to try to determine whether one took causal precedence-over the ¡other. • ,The fact 
is that since the beginning of the 1980s the region has been simultaneously sunk 
into the deepest economic depression and racked by the most serious political 
upheavals of the last fifty years, so that it is living through a climate of 
instability and confusion. It is hard to find viable solutions on the political, 
economic or social level. 
The origin, scope and possible consequences of the crisis cannot be under-
stood without analysing the main features of the evolution of the economies and 
societies of Central America since the War. The first aspect which strikes one 
is the dynamic growth achieved over a 30-year period- -naturally with differences 
from one country to another- within an atmosphere of financial and monetary 
stability. A second striking aspect is the decisive influence of external 
factors, which have been essential determinants not only of economic behaviour, 
but also of the mutual influence of many political factors. Here lie the 
historical roots of the repeated propensity of Central Americans to seek abroad 
the explanations and solutions for the problems affecting them. Furthermore, the 
fragmentation of Central America since the short-lived federation broke up has 
also contributed to the fact that each of the countries has resigned itself 
historically to having a scanty margin of action with regard to its own fate, 
due to the preponderance of factors beyond its control. 
A third noteworthy feature is that, in the thirty years since the end of 
the Second World War, most of the considerable changes undergone by the economies 
of the region have been simply juxtaposed to the economic and social structure 
which already existed before, without bringing about any essential changes in a 
process referred to in the present study as "superimposed development". 
Finally, the fruits of the long period of economic expansion which took 
place after the war were distributed in a flagrantly inequitable manner between 
the different strata of the population within the framework of a concentrative 
-or at least exclusive- process, thus preventing any significant relief of the 
extreme,poverty which persists in the region. 
/In addition 
In addition to the foregoing vccnstan'£;.factors, mention must be made of more 
recent phenomena of internal and external origin.which coulcl well, mark a break 
with-the previous development model . jpf. .pqJLiticaJL .interaction JChûs.». 
there are' new challenges; to the development of the Central American economies and 
perils for political coexistence at the national and even the regional levels 
which affect all the inhabitants, of the area. The crisis could itself give rise . 
to opportunities for improving the situation, however, if innovative responses 
to the economic and social problems of the subregion. materialize. 
In the following pages, the features of the period after the war are first 
analysed, followed by an examination of more recent phenomena. Consideration is 
then given to the short-term prospects and to a number of possibilities for at 
least reducing the negative effects of the crisis or even, seeking to reverse them 
within the framework of a development model different from that which prevailed 
in the past. .- . • ..... ,. 
/2. Main 
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2. Main features of the style of development prevailing 
in Central America after the war 
a) Economic growth 
The first feature of the development of the Central American countries 
during the last three decades was undoubtedly its sustained dynamism. The gross 
domestic product of the subregion as a whole grew at the rate of 5.3% per year 
in real terms between 1950 and 1978, although of course there were differences of 
degree between the various countries, with the highest rates corresponding to 
Nicaragua and Costa Rica and the lowest to Honduras. As a result, the per capita 
real income practically doubled during this period. Even between 1970 and 1978, 
when the subregion had to face particularly severe problems -the rise in hydrocarboi 
prices, imbalances in the international financial market, shortages of raw 
materials and of some foodstuffs in 1974-1975, various droughts and three large-
scale natural disasters- the real growth rate exceeded 5.6% per year. 
Some other features of this growth may also be noted (see figure 1). First 
of all, during the 28 years in question negative growth rates were recorded only 
on a very few occasions, almost always associated with some natural disaster 
(twice in Honduras and once in Nicaragua and Costa Rica). Secondly, while there 
were frequent cyclical fluctuations -almost annually- these took place against a 
background of notably stable growth. The cyclical droughts were only brief, and 
only exceptionally did the product fall for two years running in any of the 
countries. Finally, the cyclical evolution of the gross domestic product of the 
five countries showed great similarity, reflecting both their common form of 
insertion into the international economy and the high degree of economic inter-
dependence achieved through the integration agreements of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The most dynamic sector was generally manufacturing, propelled by the expandec 
market and industrial development policies created as part of the integration 
process. As a result, the degree of industrialization of the subregion rose from 
12.3% in 1960 to 16.8% in 1978. 
b) The decisive influence of the external sector 
The sustained manner in which the Central American economies grew largely 
reflected the long boom in the international economy which followed the Second 
World War. During that period, the industrialized countries grew at a cumulative 




CENTRAL AMERICA; EVOLUTION OF GROWTH RATES OF GDP 
1950 1955 I960 ' 1S55 r" ' W O r " 1975' " 1980 
I 1 T . , 
/Albeit in 
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Albeit in different degrees, all the countries of the subregion managed to take 
advantage of this situation: the valuè of their exports of goods and services 
to countries outside the subregion increased by a factor of thirteen between 1950 
and 1978, rising from US$ 250 million to US$ 3 200 million, while the export 
sector diversified significantly, both as regards the composition of its products 
and their geographical destination.2/ The boom in the traditional export sector 
also created sufficiently easy Conditions tó facilitate the bold decision to 
adopt mutual free trade in virtually all products originating from the subregion 
within a space of not mòre than five yearë. This was responsible for the intensive 
industrialization process which eventually became a second source of growth, 
although this never ceased to depend ultimately on the evolution of the traditional 
external sector. The easy economic situation referred to, together with the 
intensive process of modernization in the subregion, also helped to create 
consunption patterns in certain strata of the population which imitated those Of 
more advanced societies and accentuated demand for imported goods. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the external sector of the Central American 
countries underwent significant changes. The relative importance Of foreign 
trade tended to grow -the export and import coefficients for the subregion as a 
whole rose from 18.6% and 16.3% respectively in 1950 to 30.4% and 33.6% in 
1978-;3/ the structure of exports and imports changed radically -the former 
included a growing proportion of non-traditional articles, while within the 
latter the proportion of intermediate and capital goods increased-; intra-Central 
American trade grew rapidly until it accounted for a high and growing portion of 
the total exports of each of thè countries, while at the same time also accounting 
for an increasingly high proportion of their total imports; and movements on the 
capital account became more and more important as the gap on current transactions 
tended to widen and new sources of international financing, both public and 
private, became available. As a result, the servicing of the external debt began 
to absorb an increasingly large proportion of the foreign exchange ̂ generated by 
exports of goods and'Services. 
Even so, throughout this period of growth, diversification and change in 
the external relations of the region, the essential feature of those small 
agricultural export économies persisted: the evolution of the external sector 
largely explained the global economic behaviour of the economy, while the 
/restrictions originating 
restrictions originatingoin that sector marked the, limit on the:.rateiof domestic 
economic activity• > A direct relationship .is -.thus observed between the, level of 
exports on the one hand and•the rates of economic expansion, capital accumulation, 
investment, procurement ,ofj.fiscal.revenue , level of enplqyroent ?and import 
capacity-, on the .other.- -h-- - , . \ • •.-.¿'.c.. 
• ̂ m l he exteraal ̂financing, acted .as a shock absorber • during .periods of , 
contraction, preventing drops in;the value, of ejq>orts from being-; reflected . 
autoiaatically in a restriction -on the capacity; to iraport- (anjd.hence.>on.the.;growth 
capacity ,of the economy), and at.-the same:,time it also facilitated the process of 
"superimposed!development" referred to below. -. When weakening of, external demand; 
coincided with-restrictions on the flow of external financing (which; served at 
least partly to -make up for the drop; in escorts)-» however,- the,restrictions . 
originating in-the external sector .had theeffectof. inhibiting economic growth 
and even bringing;about a contraction in economic activity in real terms,. . -
The influence of; external factors on events in the countries of the 
subregion was not limited to the .economic sphere. >'Some: of the consequences of 
Central,America's dependence.on exports profoundly affected the-shaping of its 
societies and the political -order .prevailing in,them. It. is well known»; for ,,. 
example* that the cultivation of one or,twe basic export; products had a,decisive 
influence in fixing the division of labour, because of the intensive and seasonal 
nature of labour requirements for such creps. . The availability, of labour, has 
thus played .á vital part in: the economic development of the region as well as. .. 
in defining the dual andr.interdependent nature of e?cport and subsistence , 
.agriculture, and these: facts largely.explain, in turn, the inequitable,inpome 
distribution structures¿ .. ••'••.<'• . --mu 
. ,The- organization of the. Central; American economies-around,Pr two j;.¡ ¡ 
export,products profoundly;influenced.also the "patterns of authority"?, the 
symbiotic relation .between the.-dominant: economic groiups (agricultural exporters 
and traders) and,governments«,, the legacy of corruption from colonial times, 
and the repressive methods used historically to ensure the availability of labour 
have-helped to: consolidate F.thex authoritarian .and non-participative systems 
characteristic of<the periods since the w^r, which have taken different forms 
from one country "to another.*: or within a single ' country at. different times (the 
main exception.1 beingifiosta Rica-),. <•?:•• -
/Furthermore, factors 
Furthermore, factors of external origin have also decisively influenced the 
political interaction in the countries of the subregion. The virtual hegemony 
exercised by the United States since the signing of thè Clàyton-Bulwèr treaty in 
1850 has found a new expression in the period since the war because of the latent 
conflict existing between the two main superpowers of the world. This is not thè 
place to go into detail about the role of United States foreign policy in Central 
America -a topic which has been the subject of many studies in recent years-,4/ 
but it is worth stressing the considerable influence which the United States has 
achieved in the region. It is not a question, of course, of claiming that the 
United States has an omnipotent role or of insinuating that Central American 
events depend entirely on the designs of one Or the other of the superpowers, 
since the interaction between the national political actors has its own dynamics, 
but it may nevertheless be maintained that the United States has shown a capacity 
for fixing the limits of political interaction in the countries of the region by 
putting its unbalancing weight on the side of the national actors whose position 
is closest to the objectives of its own foreign policy. 
Of course the preferences of United States policy have not always formed 
a coherent set of objectives: some administrations have been mainly concerned 
with security -above all the "containment of communism"- while others have been 
more interested in gradual orderly change towards more pluralistic and equitable 
societies. In this respect, United States governments have sometimes supported 
national actors who advocate orderly and peaceful changes, within the framework 
of a foreign policy vis-à-vis the Latin Americajjr countries which some authors' 
have called "idealistic". This happened, for example, when the United States 
favoured the heterogeneous alliances which overthrew dictatorships in Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Honduras in the period following the war, or the governments 
which promoted changes under the "Alliance for Progress" in the 1960s, as well as 
the possibly somewhat reluctant support given to the similarly heterogeneous 
alliance which took power in Nicaragua in 1979. On other occasionsj the United 
States Government has preferred to help national actors who, in its opinion, have 
the best qualifications for ensuring a Mnimum of stability in the face Of radical 
challenges to the status quo. The best example of this more "realistic" policy 
might perhaps be the support given by the United States administration to the 
forces which overthrew the elected government in Guatemala in 1954. 
/At all 
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At all events,» wh$n contradictions have arisen in United States foreign 
policy, -as happens, f.|irly ̂ piten- between the .objective of promoting; orderly 
change and that of avoiding ̂ threats. to security , the United Sta;tes^Gove^ment 
has, invariably preferred^ ti?r-suppprt those actors in each country ..which.„it has ... 
considered most capable defending its own, interests. It is; in this way that 
the governments .of that country have, managed to fix the geopolitical limits 
referred to earlier,, 
c) "St^erinposed development" 
Of course the economies and societies of the Central American countries 
are very different from what they were thirty years ago, not only in quantitative 
aspects -the gross domestic product rose from US$1 950 million to US$ 7 520 
million (at 197Q prices), .between 195Q and 1980, while over the sane period the 
population rose, from eight n&llipn to over 20 million inhabitants- but also 
because important qû li,tf.tiY'? changes have taken place. The societies are much 
more segmented and .pluralistic; a.noteworthy feature is the .appearance pf 
middle-income strata attributable partly to the progressive .-urbanization (only 
16% of the population lived in urban.areas in 1950, compared with 43% in.1980); 
the importanpe of .. secondary sector activities in the economies has increased 
(their relative participation rose from 14.6% to 24.1% between the two periods in 
question), and in general, the systemof production.has been modernized and 
diversified year by year. -The different geographical regions of the countries 
are now much better integrated thanks to the heavy investments made in the 
physical transport and communications infrastructure, and advances have also 
been made in the supply of education and especially health , services'. These 
changes are to be attributed essentially to the "spillover" caused by the style 
of development which has predominated.in all the countries -albeit with specific 
characteristics from one to another- oyer thf, whole period under analysis. It 
may be considered that these changes have.generally speaking been the only oneis 
permitted by those.who, have had the possibility of keeping changes within 
certain limits, outstanding among these actors being those who obtained their 
- economic power under the. agricultural export pattern which is so vital for this 
type of historical development, in the subregion. Consequently, it may be isaid 
that the considerable Ranges which, took place in the three decades since the war 
! /ar«^ Characterized ' " 
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are characterized essentially by the way in which the new economic and social 
strata were simply juxtaposed with the existing ones within a process of change 
and modernization which did not threaten in essence the existing economic 
structure. 
The foregoing is simply another way of explaining a process of gradual . . 
peaceful change; as long as the pre-existing structures are not eliminated, then . 
all the changes which take place in patterns of development must, by definition, ' 
be of an additive or superimposed nature, although this does not mean that they 
should necessarily be scorned for this reason.' 
What it is desired to stress here, however, is that when these changes have 
seriously threatened the existing structures and vested interests , they have almost 
invariably encountered their limit, above all when the interests of the dominant . 
groups have been identical -as has frequently, but not always occurred- with those 
of the main international actor in the Central American political arena in the . 
terns already referred to-in previous paragraphs. Thus, peaceful and orderly 
changes or reforms have had to comply with very tight limits in most, of-the 
countries of the region.• To put this another way, economic progress has; caused 
an important social change, with many groups rising in the income scale and the. 
formation of middle classes, but the maintenance of this historical pattern, of. 
development has given rise to only a slow, and halting advance by the political 
institutions. The gap between the economic changes and the. strengthening of the 
political practices and institutions required by a more complex society have 
contributed to the background of instability in Central America.. 
This essential characteristic of "superimposed development" has frequently 
obliged governments to seek substitutes for changes which perhaps run the risk of 
exceeding these limits. ThUs, for example, recourse was had to external 
financing partly in order to postpone or take thé place of increases in the tax. 
base*, State land was distributed in programmes called "colonization" instead of 
reorganizing land tenure systems, and external saving was used as a substitute 
(instead of a complement) to the inadequate machinery for tapping national saving. 
By the same token, the tax burden came to be an interesting indicator of 
the limits Which'"superimposed development" had to face in Central America. 
Although important changes took place within the taxation system in all the 
countries -as a reflection of the changes which were taking place in the system 
/of production-
of production- it is curious that the procurement of fiscal resources, .as a 
percentage of the. gross domestic product, remained: constant in s.ome.: flounrtriçs. or 
only grew very slowly in ,othérs .(see table 1>. SFurthermore, this .coefficient of 
taxation was extremely low compared with that of other countries of similar. -
economic and social structure , and 'this circumstance should .i?pt\l»/.-opDS.idet)ed a 
mere' accident: organized business circles in all the :.eo tart ries j-albeit. to ¡different 
degrees- stubbornly resisted.rises in levels of: taxation,• especially taxation on 
production and income.. The financial restrictions due to. the smaller procurement 
of fiscal revenue severely limited the capacity of the, public sector to. play a 
more active role in development, while the modest-increases achieved in the 
coefficient of public expenditure (see table: 2): were increasingly financed through-
greater indebtedness, especially of external:.origin:,: • 
The- limited participation of the. public sector, in fthe: .gross domestic 
product, as measured through tftevprocuremen£ of taH-Eeyenue and central government 
expenditure, also , fitted in with .thè "anti-interyentionist" ¡position of the 
dominant groups in Central American, societies. Jn the 1950s and 1960s, the public 
sector was'gradually taking. control of sucb publie ,services as. the.-generation and 
distribution of electricity, telephone coiroiuniçations., rail transport and the 
management of ports, while State activity was also strengthened with the . 
establishment of public development banks, and institutions for regulating „the 
prices-of basic consumer goods.;.. In all countries:, however, the public sector 
scrupulously avoided participating in activities of interest to private enterprise, 
the main exception:to -this rule being the iOostaRican financial intermediation 
system.1 .•••"' •'".:?.-••.,•...•. ,..••• .? . , ...... _ :•^. . 
Another exanple of the persistence of prior structures.-in these processes 
of change was the low1level.of backward or forward integration of traditional 
agricultural export activities, in the sense that;the,sectors depending on .these , 
have not tried to diversify systematically-in order -to ;inyes,tain more complex.,, 
activities. The appearance of new agricultural export activities(cotton, sugar 
and beef) wâs thus limited to repeating the.patten? of traditional basic .rv. 
comàoditiës,• with their scanty linkages withhother..product^ve .actiKi.ties• 
other words, the traditional producers diversified only very little,, and ¡the :;State 
shared Oftly slightly in the .surplus . generated-sby .them. It ;willrthus .readily bef . 




CENTRAL AMERICA: COEFFICIENT OF TAXATION 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 19 CO 1931 1982a/ 
Central America 9.5 9.3 9.4 9.7 11.3 11.4 10.7 10.8. 
Costa Rica 10.1. 10.0 11.8 12.1 12.7 11.4 12.1 11.6 
El Salvador 10.8 10.9 9.9 10.3 12.0 • 11.1 11.3 10.9 
Guatemala 8.5 7.8 7.6 7.8 9.5 8.6 7.5 6.9 
Honduras 7.3 10.1 9.7 11.2 12.1 14.0 13.2 12.5 
Nicaragua 10.8 9.4 10.2 9.4 10.6 18.4 16.6 20.1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data, 




CENTRAL AMERICA: COEFFICIENT OF TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
Central America 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980. 1931 1902a/ 
10.6 11.2 11.3 11.6 15.3 19.3 19.5 20.3 
Costa Rica 11.2 13.3 13.8 13.7 17.9 20.0 15.5 15.3 
El Salvador 10.9 12.2 10.9 10.3 13.4 17.2 19.8 20.1 
Guatemala 9.5 9.3 10.6 9.9 12.5 15.2 16.9 14.7 
Honduras 10.0 12.2 10.8 14.7 21.0 24.9 23.7 23.6 • 
Nicaragua 12.4 11.1 11.2 11.8 19.4 29.5 28.1 39.0 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data, 
a/ Preliminary figures. 
/changes mentioned 
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changes mentioned were simply juxtaposed with them without succeeding in altering 
them in essence. Consequently, the changes occurred only within relatively 
narrow limits (although these varied somewhat from country to country). Thus, 
despite the considerable expansion and change which took place in the Central 
American economies and societies in the thirty years following the war, that 
change was, paradoxically, not sufficient to meet the growing expectations of 
numerous sectors of the population. Furthermore, the instinctive desire to 
preserve vulnerable social systems led to the maintenance in most of the countries 
of the existing economic patterns -which were able to take advantage of the boom 
in the international economy- based on political institutions which were of an 
exclusive nature, at least as regards the distribution of power and of the fruits 
of economic development. Consequently, the social mobilization and expansion which 
accompanied the postwar boom were not able to offset the backwardness of some 
political structures. 
d) The exclusive nature of development 
As a result of this, despite their economic dynamism the countries of the 
subregion were not capable during the thirty years after the war of significantly 
improving income distribution or of reducing the number ox Centreil Americans 
living in a state of extreme poverty. According to household surveys carried out 
in recent years, the poorest 20% of the population shares less than 4% of the 
national income, while at the other extreme the richest 20% of the population 
shares more than 55%. There are considerable differences from one country to 
another, the most dissimilar features corresponding once again to Costa Rica 
(see table 3). In countries where surveys were carried out at different times, 
although the methodologies used were not always comparable, the available evidence 
indicates that the gap between the groups at the two extremes of the scale 
widened, even though the relative share of the intermediate strata may have 
tended to increase (see table 4). In the case of Guatemala and Costa Rica, 
the per capita real income of the poorest 20% of the population actually went down. 
In absolute figures, out of a total of over 20 million Central Americans 
in 1980, some 13.2 million (64%) were living in a state of poverty -in the sense 
that their income did not cover their basic needs- while over 8.5 million (41%) 
did not even have sufficient income to cover the value of the minimum shopping 
basket of food considered necessary in order to meet their biological nutritional 
needs (see table 5). The situation was much more serious in rural areas than in 
/Table 11 
Table 3 
CENTRAL AMERICA: STRUCTURE OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND PER CAPITA 
INCOME LEVELS, BY COUNTRIES, TOWARDS 19.B0 -, 
(Dollars at 1970 prices) ; ~ 
Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala. Honduras V : Nicaragua 
Strata ' c%) ; Average 
income 
(%) Average income 00 
Average 
income • ( % ) . 
Average 
income ' ' ( % ) 
Average 
income 
Poorest 20% 4.0 176.7 : 2.0 46.5" 5.3 111.0 - 4.3 . 80.7. 3.0 . 61.9 
30% below the mean 17.0 • 500.8 10.0 155. 1 14.5 ,202.7 12. 7 140.0 ., 13.0 ' : 173.2 
30% above the mean 30.0 / 883.8 22.0 341.2 26. 1 364. 3 23. 7 254.6 25.0 „ 350.2 
Richest 20% :, 49.0 1 165.2 : 66:0 1 535.5' 54,. 1 1 133.6 59.3 : 756.3 5:8.0 1 199.8 1 
r-' 
•P 
Source.: ECLA, on the.basis of official data from the countries. 
Table 4 
CENTRAL AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF FAMILY INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE 1970S 
(Dollars at 1970 prices) 
Strata 
















Poorest 20% 1 088 996 -0.9 572 528 -1.4 85 287 6.4 
30% below the mean 2 014 1 962 -0.3 1 167 1 495 3.7 206 564 5.8 
30% above the mean 3 702 3 865 0.4 2 269 2 639 2.3 522 1 055 4.6 
Richest 20% 9 098 12 393 3.1 5 756 6 465 1.3 2 476 3 953 3.4 
Richest 10% 12 031 12 970 4.0 7 874 8 737 0.9 3 649 11 395 6.2 
Average income 3 752 4 426 1.7 2 29 7 2 639 1.3 731 1 338 4.1 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data from the countries, 






CENTRAL AMERICA: ESTIMATED INCIDENCE OF POVERTY TOWARDS 1980 
Total 
In a state of 
poverty 
Extreme poverty 
Basic needs not 
satisfied 
Not in a state 
of poverty 
Total 
In a state of 
poverty 
Extreme poverty 
Basic needs not 
satisfied 
Not in a state 
of poverty 
Whole of 
Central America Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala a/ Honduras b/ Nicaragua 
Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
Thousands of persons 
20 696 8 315 12 381 2 213 1 Oil 1 202 4 747 2 119 2 678 7 262 2 485 4 777 3 691 1 229 2 462 2 733 1 471 1 262 
13 178 3 738 9 440 549 138 411 3 267 1 221 2 046 5 166 1 168 3 998 2 515 540 1 975 1 681 671 1 010 
O u 647 2 130 6 517 300 75 225 2 427 943 1 484 2 879 418 2 461 2 092 376 1 716 949 318 631 
4 531 1 608 2 923 249 63 186 840 278 562 2 287 750 1 537 423 164 259 732 353 379 
7 518 4 577 2 941 1 664 873 791 1 530 898 632 2 096 1 317 779 1 176 689 487 1 052 800 252 
Percentage breakdown 
100.0 100.0 100. .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100, .0 100.0 100, .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 
63.7 45.0 76. .2 24.8 13.6 34.2 68.1 57.6 76. .4 71.1 47, .0 83.7 68.2 43.9 80.2 61.5 45 .6 80.0 
41.8 25.6 52, .6 13.6 7.4 18.7 50.6 44.5 55, .4 39.6 18, .8 51.5 56.7 30.6 69.7 34.7 21 .6 50.0 
21.9 19.4 23. ,6 11.2 6.2 15.5 17.5 13.1 21, ,0 31.5 30, ,2 32.2 11.5 13.3 10.5 26.8 24, .0 30.0 
36.3 55.0 23. ,8 75.2 86.4 65.8 31.9 42.4 23, .6 28.9 53. ,0 16.3 31.8 56.1 19.8 38.5 51. .4 20.0 
. ̂  Source: ECLA, Central American Basic Needs Project, on the basis of data from the countries and CELADE, Boletín Demográfico, Vol. XIV, No. 28. 
g. aj Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to figures from the 1979/1980 family income and expenditure survey. 
Hi 3 bj Urban/rural population breakdown corresponds to figures from the 1978/1979 family income and expenditure survey. 
01 
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urban areas, although there were ,considerable differences from one country to 
another (in Costa Rica, less than 25% of the. population lived in poverty, whereas 
in-Guatemala the proportion was over 70%). Moreover, although it is very likely, 
that the percentage of Central Americans living in a state of poverty nowadays is 
less than it was 30 years ago, it is nevertheless true that in absolute terms, 
because of population expansion, there;are new more poor people (and also more 
people who are not poor) than: iri the period immediately after the Second World War. 
In short, the characteristic style of development of the region has been 
concentrative, or at .any rate of an exclusive nature in the sense, that it has 
favoured the different strata of the population in a flagrantly inequitable 
manner, accentuating the "degree of income concentration in some countries. Like-
wise ,'• although 30 years of rapid,and sustained economic, expansion have gone by, 
over half the population of Central Anerica -and three-quarters of those living; 
in rural areas- do not have sufficient income to cover their essential needs as 
regards food, housing, clothing and basic services. 
It should be noted that the exclusive pattern of development is not limited 
to the economic and social sphere. I f it were possible to speak of a truly 
typical characteristic of political interaction in most of the Central American 
countries, then this characteristic would be the absence of broad popular 
participation, reflected in the virtual exclusion of the masses, and especially 
the rural masses, from political activity. Neither the industrialization nor 
the urbanization which have taken place since the end of the war have been able 
to bring about a decisive change in the still essentially agricultural nature of 
these societies. With a few exceptions, the masses working in rural areas continue 
to be passive observers instead of organized actors in the evolution of the 
political systems. This exclusive feature has had a decisive influence both on 
the characteristics and the scope of thè various modernization projects attempted 
in the subregion. 
Thus, with a few exceptions, the lack of effective participation on the 
part of the emerging social classes meant that they were not in a position to 
/counterbalance the 
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counterbaiahce thè weightof 'thè the handling of : , . 
public affairs, and this'soiie tiròesfurther'increased the tensions between the;' ., , 
rapid social development and thè slów institutional "development in the political;, 
sphere.' ' ''* ' ' ' " e-.;-,?.-.,.: •/• '..., •• : • 
To put'this in another-way i' except in the case of Costa. Bica the political ., 
interaction in Central America has generally been« Of:an-elitist nature and it • 
has not been able to include the mòit ftumerouS 'population! groups, of?the subregion 
in 'the ptójec1s-'ior'"the'ito'deiniÌSsà,tii<« of its *èofcìèt£é8? T̂o'i;da-'-fhi?,f*otìld have 
mean£ perhaps the elimination, although possibly only gradually,- of thè• factors ,of 
authoritarianism already referred tò;, : :àhd'it would hà^ been: necessary ito:-.undertake 
the consistently postponed reforms " aiiiiéd at fulfilling the legitimate aspirations 
of the groups Which 'have ''sò~r¥à? been- virtùàliy èjteasided from-the benefits of, ; 
development. '' "''• - : r-> :• - o ••••::..<••••:'• .v '..-.:• '. 
/3. Recent 
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3. Recent events and the current économie.crisis 
a) The break with historical trends 
In 1977-1978 the trends briefly described above reached a turning point, at 
least as regards sustained economic growth. Since that two-year period, a 
progressive slowdown has occurred which ultimately led to négative rates in all 
the countries (1982) (see figure 1). The duration, intensity and peculiar 
characteristics of this situation have no precedent in the period since the war. 
Suffice it to say that, after 30 years of expansion in the five countries' per 
capita income (with only sporadic interruptions), there has been à"sharp and 
pervasive decrease during the last five years. In Costa Rica, Guatemala and 
Honduras the absoluté level in late 1982 barely equalled that of 1976. In El 
Salvador and Nicaragua the situation was even more dramatic, since real per 
capita income had slipped to the levels of the first half of the 1960s. 
In addition, the process of economic integration, which had earlier allowed 
the downward fluctuations in the'international economy to be offset, changed 
direction and became a factor which magnified the crisis. Due to the depth of 
the crisis, together with thé political conditions and the lack of à strategy 
of subregional scope, the economic interdependence of the five countries has . 
tended to become a mechanism Which transmits recessionary economic forces. 
The fact that the pronounced deterioration in the evolution of the 
economies has coincided with a period of increasing political upheaval may be 
functionally related to some of the characteristics of Central American societies 
which were mentioned previously. Some of the many manifestations of those 
characteristics led to a questioning of the social order which involved violent 
challenges to the status quo, and' these, in turn, gave rise to violent responses 
which contributed to £ rapid polarization of positions in some countries, 
especially Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. There are many complex and 
mutually-reinforcing interrelationships among the' local political and economic 
factors and the way in which both intermix with external influences. These 
phenomena will be briefly examined below. 
b) The impact of exogenous phenomena r' 
It is no coincidence that the economic crisis has affected all of the 
countries, regardless of the extent of the social peace or upheaval prevailing 
in them, the economic policy objectives pursued, or the different relations 
/between the 
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between the public.-.and privatejsectors»; All-haVe bee»;'seriously, affected by 
factors of external origin. This has been inevitable because tbe. common r> 
denonana,tor . affecting all the^countries. has been, the deep , recession, in the . 
international economy which,, as already noted, to a great extent, determines the 
overall behaviour of the Central, American economies and, even.imposes, a limit 
upon their ability to.grow. Now, in addition to- the...worl^..recpssipi?the_ economic 
effects of the political crisis,: ..r.discouragement. of private investment., flight pf 
capital, difficulties- in attracting external financing-. haver,combined. an^ have, . ̂  
reinforced one . another to the point, where..they haye. producejd,.an. economy breakdown 
unlike.,$ny seen in Central America since, the 1930s.. 
With respect, to the ¡effects, of ¿he disarray in..jthe...intet£̂  
it may be recalled that, in,.addition to,the..industrialize£r comtries^1 .difficulties 
in 1978-1979,:rlow growth rates,..high, rates .of..inflation., savings, lags 
in .the application, of - technological innovations- .^ydroca^bpn^prices, were increased 
again in ,1979.. . Still greater .importance ..could perhaps, be, attribute^ to the . ̂  
attempts- to modify, economic ;policy. made-by .so,me,industrialized countries which ., 
have .stressed the fight .against inflation -viths some success- and have resorted, 
inter alia,, to .restrictive: monetary, measures.that have resultedin high interest^ 
rates. These policies have .undoubtedly, -.contributed,to the ,p.lowdown...of economic ^ 
activity in the countries where they. have . been, implemented». ,as n.weli .as jta l£e 
world economy in general,- with "the resulting .impact on the levels of international 
trade.' This, situation has weakened :the demand .for • the ...Central American rcountries' 
traditional exports,. Given, the ..persistent international inflation (although 
recently it: has, begun ; tp- decline).j. the weakness .o^,demand..produces a .marked 
deterioration in the terms of ..trade. An additional factor is that, in the 
financialt.sphere,. the Ceiytra.1 ̂ »ican..cQUBtries.{.h^e:£>$$1 adversely affected' by 
the high interest ..rates -on, their massive foreign .debt - and by their .recent, 
difficulties;;in gai^ng0accgss.• to. new external fi^^ping, • ,,.„•,.... 
The.ifigures -ipj f§blfs,.̂  -and 7 spê „.£c>r ...theipselyes ̂  With the decline in 
the prices of virtually all the products t^^^^g^b^^^n.tr^il. America, and _ -ttie , 
continued upward pressure on the prices ofi:i$$.^^prj^^^specially hydrocarbons. . 
in 1979^1980-£/c.the:rsubreg.ipn 'sj t^ms of tr.a<te. fype^.deteriorated by almost .50% 
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Terms of trade 
Purchasing power 
of exports of goods 
Purchasing power 
of exports of 
goods and services 
93.4 120.3 103.4 95.9 88.4 78.2 
132.6 169.3 156.5 157.3 140.1 120.4 
141.1 172.0 162.3 154.5 149.2 130.5 




CENTRAL AMERICA: TERMS OF TRADE 
Growth rates 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Total 16.7 28.8 -9.9 -7.8 -11.5 
Costa Rica 11.3 28.1 -6.8 -4.0 -6.1 -15.2 
El Salvador 29.9 24.5 -15.7 -3.2 -11.5 -14. 3 
Guatemala 10.5 40.0 -11.4 -11.8 -6.4 -8.2 
Honduras 8.2 15.4 -0.4 -12.3 -1.8 -17.6 
Nicaragua 17.7 27.4 -11.3 -11.9 0.9 -9.7 
Source; ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
/general terms, 
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general terms, the foregoing means that if the 1977 purchasing power of exports 
had been sustained, the total value of exports in 1982 would have been 40% greater 
than it was, which would have added approximately 2.0% to the gross domestic 
product in the latter year. 
Since 1978, the terms of trade have gone down each year in all of the 
countries. In addition, there has been a decline in the volume of the exports 
of some countries (including product lines, such as nickel in Guatemala, which 
have ceased to be exported because of lack of demand) as well as increasing 
difficulties in incorporating new lines of products into external sales due to the 
market restrictions and protectionist measures which some industrialized countries 
have put into effect and a considerable decrease in the exportation of some 
services such as tourism, due not only to the world economic recession but also to 
non-economic factors in Central America. 
, On the other hand, productive activity in the Central American countries 
required imports, in spite of the recession, especially in order to meet the demand 
created by the increased public spending which was promoted by the governments, 
partiv in order to counteract the sluggishness of private investnent. As a result, 
the trade deficit of the five countries went from US$ 432 million in 1977 (equal to 
2% of the GDP) to more than US$ 1 400 million in 1981 (6.8% of the GDP) (see 
table 8). There was also a spectacular increase in the debt service, attributable 
not only to increased borrowing but also, and in particular, to soaring interest 
rates. External factor payments rose, for example, from US$ 268 million in 1977 
to US$ 700 million in 1981 for the subregion as a whole. This accounts for the 
fact that the current account deficit grew from US$ 573 million to almost 
US$ 2 000 million during the same period (3.8% and 9.5% of the GDP, respectively) 
(see table 9). 
During 1979-1980 Central America had considerable access to public and 
especially private international financing. The external support for Nicaragua's 
reconstruction programmes contributed significantly to this phenomenon, and these 
resources partially replaced internal savings, which tended to be depleted 
rapidly due to public sector deficits and the flight of private capital. In 1977 
only 13.0% of total savings came from external sources, but that figure had 
increased to 46.4% in 1981 (see table 10). During the same period, the subregion's 
external public debt grew from US$ 2 400 million to US$ 7 700 million, and 
limitations on several countries' capacity for additional borrowing became obvious. 
/Table 11 
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' " Table 8 
CENTRAL AMERICA: . BALANCE 0? PAYMENTS TRADE ACCOUNT POSITION 
ÏN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND AS À PERCENTAGE OF THE GDP 
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CENTRAL AMERICA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITION IN 
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE GDP 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Millions of dollars 
Total -700 -455 -573 -1 088 -880 -•1 690 -1 965 
Costa Rica -218 -203 -226 -364 -554 -654 -382 
El Salvador -95 -11 21 -249 -24 -117 -239 
Guatemala -65 -79 -37 -271 -180 -178 -560 
Honduras -125 -115 -139 -170 -212 -334 -285 
Nicaragua -197 -47 -192 -34 90 -407 -499 
As a percentage of the GDP 
Total -7.4 -3.7 -3.8 -6.6 -4.7 -8.1 -9.5 
Costa Rica -11.4 -8.4 -7.4 -10.3 -13.7 -14.3 -12.0 
El Salvador -5.3 -0.5 0.7 -8.1 -0.7 -3.4 -7.1 
Guatemala -2.1 -1.8 -0.7 -4.5 -2.6 -2.3 -6.5 
Honduras -12.0 -8.9 -9.0 -9.3 -9.8 -13.1 -14.1 
Nicaragua -12.7 -2.5 -8.6 -1.7 4.3 -17.4 -19.7 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data. 
/Table 11 
Table 10 
CENTRAL ANERICA: EVOLUTION OF INVESTMENT AND SAVING 
(Millions of Central American pesos) 
Central America 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 





Gross domestic product at market prices 
Gross domestic investment 
Gross fixed investment 
Public 
Private 




1977 1978 1979 1980 1981a/ 
In In In In In 
absolute (%) absolute (%) absolute (%) absolute (%) absolute (%) 
terms terms terms terms terms 
7 949 100, .0 8 231 100.0 8 221 100, .0 8 301 100.0 8 213 100.0 
1 728 21 .7 1 717 20.9 1 492 18 .1 1 539 18.5 1 431 17.4 
1 603 20, .2 1 664 20 .2 1 582 19, .2 1 443 17.4 i 363 16.6 
536 6. .8 506 6 . 1 501 6 .1 587 7 .1 665 8 . 1 
1 067 13, .4 1 158 14 .1 1 081 13 .1 856 10.3 698 8 .5 
125 1, .5 53 0 . 7 - 9 0 - 1 .1 96 1 .1 68 0 . 8 
1 728 21, .7 1 717 20.9 1 492 18. .1 1 539 18.5 1 431 17.4 
196 2, ,5 324 4 . 0 232 2, .8 580 7 .0 559 6 . 8 
1 532 19, .2 1 393 16.9 1 260 15. .3 959 11.5 872 10.6 
1 518 100. ,0 1 605 100.0 1 683 100, ,0 1 693 100.0 1 632 100.0 
424 27, ,9 453 28 .2 506 30, .0 450 26.7 306 18.8 
382 25. ,2 437 27 .2 502 29. ,9 445 26 .3 330 20 .2 
106 7. .0 121 7 .5 150 8, .9 154 9 . 1 122 7.4 
276 18. .2 316 19.7 352 21, .0 291 17.2 208 12.8 
42 2. 7 16 1 .0 4 0, .1 5 0 .4 -24 - 1 . 4 
424 27. 9 453 28 .2 506 30. .0 450 26.7 306 18.8 
27 1. 8 71 4 . 4 • 128 ' 7. .6 124 7.4 5 0 . 3 
397 26'. 1 382 23 .8 378 22. ,4 326 19.3 301 18.5 
T a b l e 10 ( c o n t . ) 
1977 
I n 
a b s o l u t e (%) 
terms 
E l S a l v a d o r 
Gross domest ic product a t market p r i c e s 1 477 100.0 
Gros s domest ic investment 362 24.5 
Gross f i x e d investment 323 21.9 
P u b l i c 112 7 - 6 
P r i v a t e 211 14.3 
Changes i n s t o c k s 39 2 .6 
G l o b a l s a v i n g 362 24 .5 
E x t e r n a l s a v i n g 73 4 .9 
Domest ic s a v i n g 289 19.6 
Guatemala 
Gross domest ic p roduct a t market p r i c e s 2 891 100.0 
Gross domest ic investment 494 17.1 
Gross f i x e d investment 463 16.0 
| P u b l i c 128 4 .4 
<t> P r i v a t e 335 11.6 
o Changes i n s t o c k s 31 1 .1 
•g G l o b a l s a v i n g 494 17 .1 
% E x t e r n a l s a v i n g 48 1.7 
c Domest ic s a v i n g 446 15.4 H-
o a 
1978 1979 1980 1981a/ 
I n I n I n In 
a b s o l u t e (%) a b s o l u t e (%) a b s o l u t e (%) a b s o l u t e (%) 
terms terms terms terms 
1 542 100.0 
376 24 .4 
356 23 .1 
111 7 .2 
245 15.9 
20 1 .3 
376 24 .4 
153 9 .9 
223 14.5 
3 036 100.0 
544 18.0 
497 16.4 




102 3 .4 
442 14.6 
1 517 100.0 
336 22 .1 
322 21.2 
113 7 .4 
209 13.8 
14 0 . 9 
336 22 .1 
63 4 . 2 
273 17.9 
3 171 100.0 
477 15.0 
462 14.6 
134 4 . 2 
328 10.4 




1 372 100.0 
198 14.5 
203 14.8 
97 7 . 1 
106 7.7 
- 5 - 0 . 3 
198 14.5 
24 1 .8 
174 12.7 
3 290 100.0 
405 12 .3 
419 12.7 
169 5 . 1 
250 7 .6 
- 1 4 - 0 . 4 
405 12.3 
77 2 . 3 
328 10.0 
1 241 100.0 
162 13.1 
175 14.1 
83 6 .7 
92 7 .4 
-12 -1 .0 
162 13.1 
27 2 .2 
135 10.9 
3 323 100.0 
460 13.8 
434 13.1 
216 6 .5 
218 6 .6 
26 0 .7 
460 13.8 
154 4 .6 
306 9 .2 
T a b l e 10 ( c o n c l u s i o n ) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981a/ 
I n 





















Gross domest ic p roduc t a t market p r i c e s 938 100.0 1 004 100.0 1 072 100.0 1 089 100.0 1 084 100.0 
Gross domest ic investment 192 20 .4 240 23 .9 263 24.5 264 24 .3 213 19.6 
Gross f i x e d investment 190 20 .3 237 23 .6 250 2 3 . 3 251 23 .0 213 19.6 
P u b l i c 67 7 . 2 88 8 .7 82 7 .6 87 8 .0 65 6 . 0 
P r i v a t e 123 13 .1 149 14.9 168 15.7 164 15.0 148 13.6 
Changes i n s t ocks 2 0 . 1 3 0 . 3 13 1.2 13 1 .3 - -
G l o b a l s av ing 192 20 .4 240 23.9 263 24.5 264 24 .3 213 19.6 
E x t e r n a l s a v i n g 1 0 . 1 28 2 . 8 32 3 .0 61 5 . 6 61 5 . 6 
Domest ic s a v i n g 191 2 0 . 3 212 2 1 . 1 231 21.5 203 18.7 152 14.0 
N i c a r a g u a 
Gros s domest ic p roduc t a t market p r i c e s 1 125 100.0 1 044 100.0 778 100.0 857 100.0 933 100.0 
Gross domest ic inves tment 256 22.7 104 9 .9 - 9 0 - 1 1 . 6 222 25 .9 290 31 .1 
Gross f i x e d inves tment 245 21 .8 137 13 .1 46 5 . 9 125 14.6 211 22.6 
P u b l i c 123 10.9 62 5 . 9 22 2 . 8 80 9 . 3 179 19.2 
P r i v a t e 122 10.9 75 7 .2 24 3 .1 45 5 . 3 32 3 .4 
Changes in s t o c k s 11 0 .9 - 3 3 - 3 . 2 -136 - 1 7 . 5 97 11 .3 79 8 .5 
G l o b a l s av ing 256 22.7 104 9 . 9 - 9 0 - 1 1 . 6 222 25.9 290 31 .1 
E x t e r n a l s av ing 47 4 . 2 - 3 0 - 2 . 9 - 7 4 - 9 . 5 294 34 .3 312 33.4 
Domest ic s a v i n g 209 18.5 134 12 .8 - 1 6 - 2 . 1 - 7 2 - 8 . 4 - 2 2 - 2 . 3 
S o u r c e : ECLA, on the b a s i s o f o f f i c i a l d a t a , 
a/ P r e l i m i n a r y f i g u r e s . 
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This last circumstances combined with the constraints on the availability of 
new resources (the commercial banking system considers the subregion to be a 
high financial and political risk, while official sources have tended to diminish 
due to the austerity policies of the donor countries), has created serious 
difficulties since 1981 in obtaining net financing, and in 1982 external savings 
-far from offsetting the drop in national savings- contributed to the. trend. 
In 1980-1981 the level of economic activity in the subregion would have been 
even lower if it had not been for public and private net external financing (this 
rose from US$ 864. million tro US$ 1 728 million between 1977 and 1980) and if some 
countries had not used the international monetary reserves which they still had 
available. Nevertheless, this latter source was quickly exhausted, and by the 
third quarter of 1982 all the countries, without exception, had negative net 
reserves. 
There, was also an intense and persistent flight of capital throughout the 
subregion (in some countries more than others) due to economic and especially 
non-economic factors which aggravated each country's external position and thus 
had a decisive influence in the sharp decline of economic activity. 
... Furthermore, exogenous factors not only had an impact on the evolution of 
the economies, they also influenced political, events. As noted below, significant 
changes occurred toward the end of the 1970s in the political interaction of the 
subregion, especially in Nicaragua. Just as the long period of postwar economic 
expansion had reached a turning point, the social and political structures too had 
to undergo a major shift. These ev?nts gave rise to a heterogenous, alliance 
which challenged the ruling regime in Nicaragua. It was no coincidence, however, 
that the changes in Nicaragua -like those in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras 
in the 1940s- occurred at the same time that United States foreign policy was 
aimed at promoting orderly change based on principles which that country values. 
Thus, during a brief interlude the geopolitical boundaries referred to earlier 
were extended, and the, challenge launched in one of the countries against the 
traditional development model became viable, 
c) The challenge to the "superimposed development" model 
The programme adopted by the Government of National Reconstruction of 
Nicaragua deviates from the traditional norms. In a different context, the 
events in El Salvador also deviate from the model of "superimposed development", 
/since they 
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since they have led to changes which, in one form or another, alter the pre-existing 
structures. It could .even be said that, under the twofold onslaught, of- the, 
economic crisis:,'and the threat to the status quo, it is ,unlikely that,the, 
pre-existing structures in some countries will be able to survive witho.ut: ' 
fundamental adjustments. This in no way predetermines the nature of the social 
organizations. which might eventually replace the, preceding ones, nor their 
ideological leanings; it only means that the postwar model which has been in 
effect for more than 30 years may have run its.course. • 
Some of the economic, phenomena which are the object and the subject of the 
crisis clearly illustrate the above. One such phenomenon is capital accumulation. 
Investment has been shrinking:considerably since 1978 both as a result and as a 
cause of the reduction in economic activity, the drop in domestic savings, the 
flight of capital and the reaction of the private sector to the political and 
social tensions affecting the subregion. Table 10 shows that the domestic 
savings of the five, countries fell from 19.9% to 9.3% of the gross domestic product 
in 1981 -a serious situation for countries which are., attempting to develop. 
Private investment also suffered a marked reverse: it diminished in all of the 
countries. The subregional coefficient of private investment...diminished from 14% 
in 1978 to less than 9% in 1981, while in the countries experiencing civil unrest, 
the coefficient of private capital formation has fallen by 50% in the last, five 
years. The p-ublic sector made an effort to counteract that decrease -thereby 
accentuating another long-standing imbalance in the Central American economies: 
the public ¡finance deficit- but it was not enough; the. coefficient of total 
investment, declined in all the countries and tended , to create bottlenecks in ... ,:v, 
areas where public spending cannot ̂ substitute' for private investment. 
The deliberate efforts made by governments to counteract the reduction in 
economic activity, at a, time when there was,a downward trend in. tax revenues, 
caused the portion of the subregional GDP represented by public spending to 
increase from 17.7% in 1977 to 21.3% in 1981,.,while the taxation rate decreased 
from 12.9% to 11.6% during the same period. As a result of the asymmetry in the 
patterns of expenditure and income, the aggregate deficit of the five governments 
increased from 460 million Central American pesos.in 1977.(3% of the GDP).to 
more than 1 600 million pesos in 1981 (7. 8% of thg -GDE) ; (see, table 11). Given the, 




CENTRAL AMERICA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 
1976 19.7 7 1973 , 1979 1980 1981a 
Millions of Central American pesos 
Total -579 •' -459 -910. -1 470 -1 614 
Costa Rica. . -150 -211 -324 -418 -104 
El Salvador -27 60 - -52 -36 -198 -232 
Guatemala -225. • -90 -13 G -254 -446 -667 
Honduras ' > ..-04 -102 -.150 -140 -243 -24G 
Nicaragua .-93 -1133 -238 -156 -165 -283 
As a percentage of the GDP 
Total -4.7 -3.0 -4. (! -4.9 -7.1 -7.8 
Costa Rica -6.2 -4.4 -6.0 -8.0 -9.2 -5.C 
El Salvador -1.1 2.1 -1.7 -1.0 -5.7 -6.9 
Guatemala -5.2 -1.8 -2.3 -3.7 -5.7 -7.7 
Honduras -6.5 -6.6 -3.2 -6.5 -9.5 -12.3 
Nicaragua -5.0 . -8.2 -11.7 -7.5 -7.1 -11.2 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of official data, 
a./ Preliminary figures. 
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was vised, but this expedient indirectly exacerbated the disequilibrium in the 
balance of payments -through the imported component of expenditure- and, in son® 
cases, absorbed most of the expansion in domestic credit , thereby taking away 
resources from the private national sectors» Thus forces came into play which 
are tending to destroy, or already have destroyed, the tradit ional s tab i l i ty of 
prices in the countries of the subregion. This i s another manifestation of the 
gradual functional impoverishment of the pre-existing structures. 
& The consequences f o r intra-Central American co-operation 
The constraints of the external sector - r e f l ec ted in the shortage of foreign 
exchange- have worsened to such an extent that, as from 1981, the countries with 
def ic i ts in intra-regional trade have even had d i f f i cu l t i e s in covering their 
debit balances. At f i r s t , the central banks of the surplus countries extended 
b i l a te ra l l ines of credit, and later a subregional mechanism was established to 
deal with the sane problem multi lateral ly (the Central American Common Market 
Fund). However, when these avenues were exhausted 6/ -and when suf f ic ient backing 
from the international community was not forthcoming- the lack of foreign 
exchange began to limit intra-Central American trade. 
The response of some countries to the constraints on their external sector 
was to adopt exchange measures (variations in par i ty , adoption of multiple rates 
or of controls on the movement of foreign exchange) which af fected the terms of 
trade at the inter-Central American level and, in some cases, limited the volume 
of commercial transactions. As a result of a l l these phenomena, intra-regional 
trade ceased to play i t s tradit ional role as a factor capable of o f f set t ing 
cycl ical lows in extraregional trade and became one more victim of the cr is is 
in the external sector. Thus, in 1982 i t was estimated that the value of this 
trade would diminish by almost 20% (from 925 million Central American pesos in 
1981 to 750 million pesos in 1982) and that i t s re lat ive share of the subregion's 
tota l exports would shrink from 21.1% to 19.3%. 
One of this s i tuat ion 's innumerable e f fects on the productive apparatus 
was that the degree of industrialization (which, as already noted, had increased 
consistently between 1950 and 1978) stagnated, diminishing from 17.1% in 1978 to 
16.2% in 1982. In other words, industrial ization, whose expansion had been more 
dynamic than that of the economy as a whole during the boom, has turned out to 
be less dynamic than the economy as a whole during the recession. 
/Despite the 
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Despite the fact that the Central American governments have traditionally-
been, and continue to be, successful in keeping the sphere of economic co-operation 
separate from the sphere of po l i t i c a l relations,, the growing ideological 
heterogeneity now poses a latent threat that po l i t i c a l differences w i l l overflow 
into the sphere of economic co-operation precisely at the time when intra-regional 
co-operation is most needed in order to mitigate the effects:.of the external sector 
problems. In addition, the danger of the internationalization of intra-regional 
confl icts could lead to a greater fragmentation of the Central American Isthmus 
and a repetition of painful h istor ica l episodes, 
e ) Summary 
In short, the subregion is. experiencing a , c r i t i c a l situation of unprecedented 
magnitude and depth. Economic activity has been diminishing, and this has been 
accompanied by growing external imbalances as we l l as by a sharp downturn in the 
levels of public sector saving and investment, together with a smaller and smaller 
radius of action f o r overcoming these imbalances. 
The high and r is ing levels of open unemployment and underemployment suggest 
that the long-standing inequalities of the Central American economies w i l l tend 
to worsen. The prolonged, depression and.the limited capacity of some of the 
countries fo r external borrowing have required the adoption of adjustment programmes 
-soma in accordance with commitments to the International Monetary Fund- which 
involve the adoption.of unpopular economic pol ic ies . 
The subregion is experiencing an intense, po l i t i c a l upheaval which is closely 
related to the above-mentioned economic phenomena, a l l of which may be the prelude 
to a breakdown of "superimposed development" at a time when i t is s t i l l not 
possible to glimpse the features of any alternative nodel of development. Moreover, 
given the unpromising economic prospects already.described, not even the most 
optimistic of men would fee l encouraged to embark on socia l transformations, yet 
without them the po l i t ica l s tab i l i ty of. various countries in the subregion i s in 
danger. 
The intensity of the cr is is has given rise to an atmosphere of demoralization 
which we do not know how to approach or overcome. Unanswered questions, and even 
bewilderment, arise out of the real ization that many problems surpass the 
constituted governments V capacity for action and are beginning to erode the very 
foundations of the process of Central American integration. 
Short-term 
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4. Short-term prospects 
a) Alternative scenarios and the need to adapt the Central American style of 
development to thé nèw circumstances ~ r ; " -, ^ • ~ 
I f the international econoTry had !retained the characteristics which i t had had 
at the end of the Second World War, there can be l i t t l e doubt that for-economies 
with small markets such as" those of Central America, the best and perhaps only 
way of ' increasing the levels of well -being of their population would have -been' to 
seek their dynamic incorporation into external trade f lows, although not necessarily 
in the same forms as in the past. •" ;S 
In e f f e c t , because of the scale and characteristics of the markets of the 
Central American -countries -even when considered together- there can be no doubt 
that, regardless' of whatever set of economic policies- may be adopted in each - •" / 
country to stimulate i ts own economy' and promote more equitable distribution of 
the f ru i t s of development, external demand would have to continue playing a 
decisive role in determining levels of production, while imports from thé exterior 
would play an equally v i t a l function in supplying the region. In other words, 
regardless of the style of development which each country might select , i t would be 
absurd to think of any poss ib i l i ty of Central American- development outside the 
flows of international trade. 
I t would be equally-mistaken, however, to place a l l the'hopes of the 
subregion in a development strategy oriented towards external markets whose 
evolution depends on many imponderable factors . At the very least , i t must be 
taken into account that the industrial ized economies -and the international economy 
in general- may have to make far-reaching' structural changes whose consequences 
are impossible to predict. Is the world facing a prolonged period of recession 
or very slow expansion, with only limited poss ib i l i t i es of reactivating 
international trade and even with the danger that those trade flows may continue 
to shrink? Or may i t perhaps be possible, in contrast, to achieve rapid and 
sustained reactivation of the main industrial powers, as some authors maintain, 
on the basis of highly advanced technological act iv it ies such as"genetic 
engineering, microelectronics and robotizâtion? I f reactivation of the 
industrial ized economies i s achieved on these new technical bases, then what 
consequences could result from this f o r the Central American countries, whose 
capacity of adaptation to the new circumstances i s much sftiâllé'r? In spite of 
/the many 
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the many studies on the topic published recently both in academic circles and by 
international and intergovernmental organizations, the complex set of factors 
intervening in the international c r i s i s means that any forecast which i s made can 
only be mere speculation. 
I t might, however, be assumed as a r ea l i s t i c hypothesis that the prolonged 
boom period of the industrial ized economies in recent decades has reached i t s 
turning point, and that the period of adjustment to a new situation whose features 
are s t i l l to be defined must necessarily be re lat ive ly long. Furthermore, during 
this period the developing countries in general and the Central American countries 
in part icular w i l l not be in similar conditions to those which prevailed in recent 
year« . In part icular , the poss ib i l i ty of procuring large amounts of external 
financing i s l ike ly to be constrained not only by the limitations associated 
with the countries' ovm capacity f o r indebtedness or f o r attracting direct 
investment, but also by the contraction in the. ava i lab i l i ty of public and private 
international resources as a result of the drop in the surpluses of the o i l -
exporting countries, the austerity pol icies which form part of the adjustment 
process in the industrial ized economies, the problems of indebtedness of the 
developing countries, and the d i f f i cu l t i e s experienced by the o f f i c i a l multi lateral 
bodies in replenishing their capital . 
Even i f i t subsequently happened that the international economic cr is is 
turned out to be a mere depressive cycle - a l be i t the most serious since the war-
followed by a recovery phase (which apparently has already begun in the United 
States ) , the positive e f fects of the la t ter on the Central American countries 
could only be very limited during the next two years in view of the considerable 
burden represented f o r almost a l l of them by the accumulated, external debt, the 
depletion of their international monetary reserves, and the profound imbalances 
- d i f f i c u l t to overcome in the short term- which the recent recession must have 
caused in their production capacity and social structure. 
Nor is i t possible to think of an economic reactivation based on the recovery 
of levels of saving and investment at the domestic level unti l such time as i t 
i s possible to dispel the reigning climate of ins tab i l i ty . This, in i t s turn, 
cal ls fo r s igni f icant changes in the pattern of po l i t i c a l interaction in most of 
the Central American countries. As long as the present degree of polarization of 
po l i t i ca l tendencies, which have boi led over into situations of violence, i s 
/maintained, and 
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maintained, and until such time as a way i s found to improve the r ea l participation 
of the broad masses in po l i t i c a l l i f e , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how i t can be 
possible to restore soc ia l s tab i l i ty and thus enable attention to be turned to 
the achievement of objectives connected with material wel l -being. I t has already 
been noted that the challenges to the tradit ional structures in some countries 
foreshadow a break with the past, but the characteristics of the soc ia l order 
which may emerge in each of the countries as a consequence of the coirplex phenomena 
thus described are s t i l l f a r from clear. 
Be that as i t may, unless the necessary corrective measures are adopted soon, 
the present situation -which i s already c r i t i c a l - w i l l inevitably tend to 
deteriorate s t i l l further, .with unforeseeable and even unmanageable consequences. 
In the economic sphere of each country, i t i s only possible to foresee at present 
rising, ^employment, a drop in real per. capita income, declining levels of saving 
and investment., and persistent f l i ghts of capital . At the subregional economic 
leve l , the important advances, in intra-Central American co-operation achieved in 
30 years of resolute e f f o r t could crumble in the face of the dual problem of the 
shortage of foreign exchange (which has led to the adoption of national measures 
whose consequences include restrictions on mutual trade) and the tensions aris ing 
from the growing internal division of soma countries or the likewise growing 
ideological heterogeneity between them. 
In the po l i t i ca l sphere, the events of recent times have aroused the interest 
of the international community and led to an increased presence of external actors 
on the Central American stage. The entry of new international forces on this 
stage and the depth of the economic cr is is combine to make a potential ly 
explosive mixture. The perilous consequences of the search f o r external a l l i e s 
on the part of the d i f ferent actors facing each other in the arena of Central 
American domestic policy l i e in the probable internationalization of national 
confl icts because the international p o l i t i c a l system i s s p l i t down the middle. 
In short, the domestic and.external, economic and extra-economic circumstances 
which.gave r i se . to the evolution of the Central American economies and societies 
in the thirty years a f te r the end of the Second World War are now. total ly altered. 
/The Central 
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The Central American governments, both individually and col lect ively , must 
obviously do a l l they can to prevent such unfavourable tendencies from getting 
the upper hand. Otherwise, the future awaiting the Central American countries 
-subject to differences of degree between one and another- would be to pass from 
the relat ive economic dynamism of the last 30 years to a downward path which 
would mean a virtual return to the subsistence economy, while the growing 
po l i t i c a l polarization foreshadows an increasing degree of authoritarianism and 
even the risk of violent confl icts which go beyond the purely national sphere. 
These future prospects could also witness the ruin of the economic co-operation 
e f fo r t s carried out so enthusiastically in past decades. 
k) Requirements of a style of development f i t t ed to the new circumstances 
The recognition that we are facing circumstances which are markedly 
d i f ferent from those prevail ing in the period following the war would constitute 
the f i r s t step fo r governments in moving towards a qual itatively di f ferent policy. 
In recent years, the international economy has changed from being a re l iab le 
source of support fo r the growth of the countries of the. region to a source of 
ins tab i l i ty , and as has happened so many times in the history of Central America, 
i t has marked the limit -and a very s t r i c t l imit - f o r the expansion of their 
economies. The recent changes in the po l i t i ca l sphere, f o r their part , together 
with the tradit ional tendency to look abroad f o r explanations and solutions, 
constitute new r isks , especial ly fo r intra-Central American co-operation. 
The countries of the subregion should not resign themselves to meekly 
suf fer ing the consequences of an adverse external environment. What they should 
do should be rather to seek to expand their room f o r action with the aim of 
gaining some degree of autonomy -no matter how modest i t may be- without of course 
sacr i f i c ing the poss ib i l i ty of taking advantage of such dynamic impulses as the 
international economy may continue to generate. The objective pursued, ultimately, 
should be that Central America keeps on advancing towards greater control of i t s 
own destiny, both in the economic aid the po l i t i ca l f i e l d s . . 
In the f i r s t of these f i e l d s , i t i s not a question of proposing Utopian 
solutions such.as, fo r example, trying to partly isolate the countries from the 
international flows,, but neither i s . i t a question of shrugging one's shoulders 
and passively accepting the cost of adaptation to the uncertain and adverse 
situation of the international economy. A r ea l i s t i c but more active approach 
/would be 
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would be one whereby the countries, as wel l as taking advantage of the opportunities 
of fered by the international economy, would seek ways of reducing the vulnerabil ity 
of their economies through the. creation of alternative poles of development and 
modification of the tradit ional patterns of consumption and accumulation. In the 
second of these f i e l d s , what would be called f o r would be an exp l ic i t recognition 
by the Central American governments of the fact that the international circumstances 
make i t necessary to draw a distinction between economic aid proper and aid which 
may imply the interference of external actors seeking to internationalize national 
and intra-regional conf l icts . 
I t i s not sought here to spe l l out in detai l the characteristics of a 
Central American development strategy in line with the new economic circumstances. 
Unfortunately, there are no set economic policy models f o r tackling the problem of 
the reduced opportunities in the international economy.or the uncertain situation 
prevail ing in each of the economies of Central America and in the region as a 
whole. A f i r s t approximation, however, could be to identi fy the essential require-
ments of a more active approach to the adjustment to and compensation f o r the 
dominant recessive tendencies. These requirements would come to form part of a 
development style whose concrete expression, in view of the absence of theoretical 
solutions, would have to be gradually perfected through successive approximations 
as a function of the current part icular demands of each country. 
i ) Definition of the structure of. production desired. The f i r s t requirement 
in a development style qual itat ively di f ferent from that prevail ing in the past 
would be to define with some precision the sectoral and subsectoral p r ior i t ies of 
an economic policy aimed at the selective reactivation of production. In this 
respect, .the countries of the region could take a pragmatic approach consisting 
of taking maximum advantage of the poss ib i l i t i es which the international market 
might continue to o f f e r , while at the same time giving a decided inpulse to 
e f f i c i en t import substitution. In e f f ec t , the subregion taken as a whole represents 
a su f f i c ient ly large resource base f o r considerably expanding and diversi fying the 
present production capacity without incurring disproportionate costs 
As regards production f o r external markets, f o r example, there i s no reason 
why Central America should resign i t s e l f to limiting i t s exports to f ive or s ix 
basic products, since i t s resource endowment and i t s geographical location mean 
that in spite of the uncertain, prospects of the international market there are 
/obvious poss ib i l i t i es 
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obvious poss ib i l i t i es f o r expanding and diversifying sales of a whole range of 
products derived from the agricultural sector. These include f r u i t , vegetables, 
maat, dairy products, marine products and chemical inputs of vegetable or igin, a l l 
capable, of being subjected to increasing degrees of processing. The exploitation 
of forest resources, too, represents an important potential fo r some countries. 
In this respect, the specialized evolution of the manufacturing sector in the 
Scandinavian countries during the present century could provide some useful 
lessons f o r Central America, as could the progress made by some Asian economies 
in the export of manufactures of high labour density. 
In anticipation of the probable tendencies towards industr ia l redeployment at 
the international l eve l , the sk i l l s of the subregion's labour force should be 
developed in order to participate, among other poss ib i l i t i e s , in the expansion 
which w i l l characterize the di f ferent branches of the electronics industry, both 
as regards products and as regards the,development of systems. A l l the foregoing 
would be a couplement -not a substitute- for the tradit ional export act ivit ies 
of which, the countries of the subregion have had experience fo r decades and which 
w i l l assuredly more than maintain their competitivity on the world market. 
In short, the present limitations on international demand should not lead 
Central American governments.to give up their e f fo r t s to increase the generation of 
foreign exchange through exports; on the contrary, these e f fo r ts should be 
redoubled and new measures should be taken in the f i e lds of f i s c a l and exchange 
rate practices and the organization of production and marketing in order to gain 
access to the markets of third countries. 
As regards production fo r domestic consumption, the highest pr ior ity should 
be given to the supply of food - a branch in which Central America has achieved 
virtual se l f - su f f i c iency in the past and can do so again- and the promotion of 
relations between agriculture and industry which w i l l make i t possible to sustain 
and guarantee this se l f - su f f i c iency and also to generate exportable surpluses. 
Furthermore, there i s s t i l l ample potential in the subregion fo r -the substitution 
of industr ia l imports on reasonably. e f f i c i en t terms, especially i f industry takes 
advantage of the economies of scale implicit in the subregional market. Among 
the branches which o f f e r the best prospects are industrial development in 
connection with agriculture, construction and basic consumption art ic les . 
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In selecting the act iv i t ies - to be given support in the economic pol icy, a 
criterion of special importance could be that connected with their capacity to 
: generate productive employment, in view of the probable tendencies of labour 
supply and demand. In this respect\ it-would be possible to select labour-intensive 
techniques in the agr icultura l sector and also to support manufacturing act iv i t ies 
of the sane nature.. 
i i ) Realism and pragmatism» One of the main problems which arises when 
formulating an economic policy is : the uncertainty which largely stems from factors 
tradit ional ly outside the control of the governments of the subregion. -Reference 
has already , been , made to the doubts which exist regarding the future evolution of 
the international economy, the changes to which thé industrial ized economies must 
face 'up, or the result of : the re lat ive ly untried pol icies being implemented in some 
of the main, industrial ized countries. I t i s not 'yet known what influence these 
factors could have in the developing countries in general and those of Central 
America in part icular , nor does anyone know what the final-outcome of the grave 
po l i t i c a l and socia l tensions .present in some countries of the subregion w i l l be. 
Thé .foregoing- means that the economic''policy- of-the Central American countries 
must be. designed and applied with f l ex ib i l i t y - and realism so that i t can be 
.progressively adapted and adjusted to changing, unpredictable and bas ica l ly 
unprecedented circumstances. Flexibi l i ty-and e f fect ive responses imply some 
degree; of break with the past, because tradit ional ly pol ic ies have tended to 
react passively or with considerable delay to the vicissitudes of the international 
economy. Today, in view of the risk that-what we are facing i s not so much a 
recessive cycle as à structural change in the world economy, i t i s necessary to 
bui ld a. response capacity which Wi l l make i t possible to take advantage of even the 
s l ightest opportunities and'reduceias-far as possible the factors•l imiting the 
development of the countr iesof the ;subregion: aspects which -have -particularly 
important implications as regards the conception and role corresponding to the 
State in guiding the future economic'evolution of Central America. 
In the same line of ideas, the current uncertainty and lack of we l l - t r i ed 
solutions mean that a newsty le of development must adapt i t s e l f conceptually to a 
decidedly pragmatic approach. f'This is not the moment to be trying out part icular 
economic-doctrines, as the recent experience in Latin America "has Shown so • 
eloquently. One of the results of the disorder reigning in the international 
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economy, for example, i s that i t i s just as risky to throw the entire weight of 
economic policy behind a strategy oriented towards more dynamic insertion into 
world trade as i t i s to adopt a strategy which prevents a country from taking 
advantage of the potential it ies of such trade. Economic policy must undoubtedly 
be planned with su f f ic ient f l e x i b i l i t y to enable i t to be adapted without 
d i f f i cu l ty to a l l the changing conditions of external and internal markets. 
In a situation of general lack of confidence on the part of son© of the main 
economic agents, i t seems completely inappropriate to leave adjustment programmes 
exclusively at the mercy of the evolution of the international market and the play 
of the market forces. Thus, f o r example, in view of the acute shortage of foreign 
exchange which characterizes a l l the economies of the subregion, i t would be quite 
unsuitable to depend on the supply and demand of foreign exchange f o r the f ix ing 
of exchange par i t ies , since repressed needs and speculative pressures tend to value 
"hard" currencies f a r .above what they are real ly worth. I t would be equally 
foolhardy to depend only on administrative controls and exaggerated centralization 
in the application of economic policy when dealing with imbalances of an external 
or internal nature. I t must be stressed once again that what i s heeded is a 
pragmatic approach which makes i t possible to achieve certain objectives and 
reduce the e f fects of the cr is is on employment. 
i i i ) Austerity. The international depression has been ref lected in a number 
of restrictions attributable to the need to reduce imports and ultimately levels of 
economic act iv i ty . In no way, however, has the resulting austerity had an equal 
impact on the di f ferent strata of the population. The shortage of foreign exchange, 
the need to increase the mobilization of domestic saving in view of the restrictions 
on external financing, and the need to sat i s fy the most basic needs of the 
population make i t necessary to ensure much more selective and careful use of thè 
resources generated by exports and, in general, to follow an impartially s t r i c t 
pattern of expenditure. In short, the new economic circumstances mean that the 
structures of expenditure and saving must also be adapted to them, and this should 
be ref lected in austerity consumption patterns in both the private and public 
sectors. 
This austerity has a dual aim: to save foreign currency through the reduction 
of consumption of non-essential goods and services which are either imported or have 
a high imported content, and to increase the coef f ic ient of saving. 
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As regards the f i r s t of these aspectss the countries of the region .must use, 
the foreign exchange they manage to obtain from their exports with the greatest -.care 
and the s t r ic test se lect iv i ty , and as already noted this w i l l c a l l for,important 
changes in tradit ional patterns of consumption and features of investment. As 
regards consumption, governments should discourage the consumption-of.hon-essential 
goods and services of external or ig in, while they should, take maximum advantage of 
national and subregional potential f o r supplying demand. This could result, in a 
l i festy le ' d i f ferent from that usually observed in the past, above 'a l l in the . 
middle smd upper income levels of Central American society... I t goes without 
saying, of course, that one-cannot seek to reduce s t i l l , further the. standards of 
l iv ing of the masses who'are'already l iving below the'poverty l ine . On the contrary, 
as stated below,'what i s required i s a redistributive e f f o r t which, among other . 
aspects, w i l l give greatest support to the sat is fact ion of the basic needs.of the 
population. . ' • 
As regards investment, everything points to-the desirabi l ity, of reviewing, 
the poss ib i l i t i es of using more labour-intensive t echno log i e sno t only because 
of the pressing need to create jobs, but also because of the need to .reduce the; 
imported component in new f ixed capital . . 
The foregoing guidelines are of use f o r a l l the d i f fe rent types of 
governments , regardless of the economic policy objectives pursued: or the means 
adopted to achieve them. Some governments w i l l place emphasis on exchange and 
taxation policy in order to achieve the most effective, use of their foreign 
exchange, others w i l l adopt administrative systems designed to ration the 
allocation of such resources while s t i l l others w i l l use a combination of 
mechanisms designed to secure the selective discouragement; of imports. In the 
f i n a l analysis, What i s needed is to bring about the rational and careful 
ut i l izat ion of scarce foreign exchange in: order to reduce as f a r as possible the 
adverse repercussions caused by the international economic situation. 
Improving the selective ut i l izat ion of the foreign exchange generated by 
exports means that the governments of the subregion must do a l l they can to 
rationalize public expenditure and reorient i t towards truly essential act iv i t i es . 
The foregoing assumes part icular inportance because, on the one hand, the pers i s -
tence of the international crisis, and other factors of a domesti-c nature foreshadow 
the intensif ication of soc ia l pressures on governments to f u l f i l their 
/responsibi l it ies f o r 
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responsibi l i t ies fo r the economic development and well-being of the population, 
while on the other hand the markedly open nature of the Central American economies 
imposes s t r i c t limits on the de f ic i t financing of public expenditure because of 
i t s domestic e f fects and i t s repercussions on the balance of payments. In this 
respect, i t w i l l be necessary to suppress luxury or non-essential expenditure and 
seek to advance above a l l in the po l i t i ca l detente of the region, so as to be 
able to transfer part of the resources now devoted to military purposes to the 
promotion of development. 
Furthermore, public expenditure i t s e l f could help to reduce the external 
imbalance i f , in selecting investments, preference is given to projects which 
require a high proportion of national or subregional imports. At a l l events, the 
public sector w i l l have to increase i t s procurement of revenue in keeping with i t s 
expenditure, in order to prevent f inancia l def ic its from contributing to 
inflationary demand fo r imported goods. 
Eff iciency. Another basic requirement of a strategy in keeping with 
the new circumstances i s that i t should ensure that growth is based on increases 
in ef f ic iency and productivity. In the present circumstances, improving ef f ic iency 
is absolutely essential , both from the macro and microeconomrc point of view, in 
order to increase the multiplier e f fects of saving and iiitfestirtent, to substitute 
imports on reasonably competitive terms, or to maintain and- expand exports to 
international markets. I t i s the duty of the State to improve the ef f iciency of 
the services which i t provides and to encourage the productivity of enterprises, by 
making reasonable use of f i s c a l and credit instruments. 
A s igni f icant increase in ef f ic iency and employment in the. subregion can be 
achieved without having resort to imports of capital goods, simply by making f u l l 
use of the existing insta l led capacity. As is wel l known, there i s a considerable 
amount of id le capacity, above a l l in almost a l l branches of manufacturing. There 
is also an .ample margin f o r considerably increasing the productivity of the area 
cultivated in the case of most of the agricultural products of the subregion, even 
those where the countries have had the greatest.success with their exports. 
v) Defending the minimum requirements of the masses. I f i t did not prove 
possible to bring about any s igni f icant reduction in extreme poverty even during 
the 30 years of dynamic expansion of the Central American economies, then i t i s 
inevitable that this situation should grow worse as the economic cr is is pers is ts . 
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since there i s a direct interrelation between levels of employment and dëgrèes of 
poverty. In the last two years, open unemployment and underemployment have 
increased, and unless some way of avoiding this i s fóimd, this tendency w i l l be 
aggravated in the immediate future. 
Unless thè State takes clear measures in favour of the masses, the depressive 
e f fects of the cr is is -and of the austerity pol icies accompanying i t - w i l l tend to 
have a disproportionately severe impact on these groups, which are the least wel l 
organized to defend themselves, and among other consequences this w i l l bring about 
a widening of the gulf between the governing and the governed. 
The spread of absolute poverty is unacceptable from any point of view. I t 
must be understood, however, that a policy aimed at sat is fy ing the basic needs of 
the masses i s hard to implement even in tines of rapid ¿conomic expansion, and i t 
is s t i l l more d i f f i c u l t to achieve at times of severe restrictions, including those 
af fect ing the public finances. At a l l events, reducing poverty i s an essential 
part of the development appiroach which i s needed. Without i t , a l l e f f o r t s to 
overcome the cr i s i s would be meaningless, since the spread of socia l discontent 
could make social 'ténsions unmanageable and make i t impossible to retain savings, 
i . e . , i t would adversely a f f ec t the whole procèss of investment and development. 
Thus, in economic policy top pr ior i ty should be given tó agricultural ' and food 
systems, especial ly as regards act iv it ies which make" intensive use of labour. 
The provision of social-type housing and the supply of health and educational 
services also ca l l for pr ior i ty attention. 
I t i s necessary to f ind some way of sat is fying thè basic needs of the 
population which involves a re lat ive ly modest imported component, in order to keep 
in line with the foreign exchange restr ict ions. At a l l évènts, and quii te apart 
from considerations of equity, the po l i t i ca l cr is is in many countries of Central 
America has reached a point at which i t i s absolutely indispensable to restore a 
minimum of peaceful understanding among the population. I f this i s not done, then 
the soc ia l instab i l i ty w i l l inevitably be transformed into'economic instab i l i ty 
by paralysing, f o r example, the process of capital formation and leading to a 
kind of State-dominated expenditure which would be of l i t t i ë -T^èlp in-expanding 
productive act iv i t ies . 
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c) Implications as regards economic policy lines 
A style of development which is d i f ferent from that prevailing f o r the last 
three decades would probably have to be rather more inward-looking than the 
h is tor ica l model, at least in the next few years. Thus, i f the international 
economy does indeed turn out to su f f e r from a prolonged period of stagnation or i f , 
even in a recovery phase, i t does not give r ise to su f f ic ient ly dynamic impulses 
fo r the Central American countries, i t i s log ica l that these countries should place 
greater emphasis on domestic demand in order to provide these impulses. Emphasis 
must be placed on the c r i t i ca l importance of co-operative e f fo r t s at the subregional 
level in support of an e f f o r t of this type, with a view to overcoming the obstacles 
of smallness of thè market which cannot be solved at the purely national level . 
At the same time, the gradual restructuring of consumption in a context of 
austerity and of a policy deliberately aimed at sat is fy ing the most basic needs of 
the population would reactivate domestic and subregional demand, at least f o r 
certain types of goods and services. 
There would be no question of having tò face a dilemma (which would in any 
case be completely f a l s e ) between stimulating domestic demand and possibly foregoing 
the benefits of a reactivation of external demand. A f l ex ib l e and selective 
economic policy would enable the countries to make better use of the incentives of 
the national and subregional markets, while i t Would hot stand in the way of 
taking advantage of such opportunities as the international economy might o f f e r . 
I t has already been noted that there i s no set of models which can guarantee 
the effectiveness of new pol icies taking account óf the requirements mentioned 
above. In order to achieve success, however,1 i t w i l l be necessary -quite apart 
from the spec i f ic economic policy objectives which each country pursues and thé 
mechanisms adopted in order to achieve them- to encourage saving, promote growth, 
and defend the basic needs of the masses. In some countries, the fulf i lment of 
such diverse requirements w i l l ca l l f o r the adoption of reforms which are long 
overdue, above a l l in the area of agrarian reform and taxation, and i t w i l l mean 
that every growth strategy must pay marked attention to the satisfaction of the 




I f the h istor ica l growth model were'followed, then f a r from being able to 
put into practice minimum programmes for the expansion of job opportunities, a l l 
that could be . e j e c t ed in Central America would be increasing open unemployment 
and underemployment. One of the essential ¿aspects of the approach proposed heré : 
would therefore be to take the f u l l e s t advantage of the most abundant resource 
in the subregion - i t s labour- in order to prevent the international recession from, 
being re f lected in s t i l l greater-.levels of poverty. 
Much has already been written on this subject, and this i s not the moment to 
repeat arguments; I t i s worth emphasizing, however, that the'main cr i te r ia :which 
should be followed by economic policy in the coming years should be that regarding 
i ts impact on employment, with the précise aim of contributing one of the basic 
ingredients f o r a kind of new :social, consensus to 'dea l with a c r i s i s which is 
d i f f i c u l t to solve by tradit ional instruments. ' . • • ' . 
The foregoing guidelines would f ind more concrete expression in the 
application of exchange, credit, taxation and public expenditure pol ic ies and in 
the techniques selected to develop investment programmes. At the same time, i t 
should be reiterated that placing emphasis on: a more.inward-looking approach than 
that h istor ica l ly followed would not mean that there should be any slackening in 
e f fo r ts to take advantage of such opportunities as external demand might continue 
to o f f e r . In this respect, the non-reciprócal preferences recently made available 
by various countries, including the United States.of America and to a lesser 
extent Mexico, might o f f e r new potential worthy Of being explored. 
Final ly , l i t t l e could be expected from the adoption of the economic policy 
cr i ter ia and guidelines sketched above unless a way out is found from the social 
and po l i t i c a l tensions which have arisen in some of thè countries of the subregion. 
This i s an extremely complex-problem which does not admit of simple ór much less 
of standardized solutions. I t i s not-desired.to enter into any discussion whatever 
on this subject in the present study, but i t must be emphasized that a minimum of 
s tab i l i ty and peaceful arid harmonious" coexistence -both within each of the countries 
and in the subregion as a whole- is a prerequisite f o r any serious, attempt'at 
development and at the reactivation of private investments . A way .must/therefore 
be found to make economic, socia l and po l i t i c a l demands give way to a participation 
model in which these demands are analysed and ordered in open processes of po l i t i ca l 
negotiation so that they can subsequently be incorporated in concrete form in 
/government programmes. 
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government programmes. I t w i l l also be necessary fo r Central Americans to gain the 
fu l l e s t possible control over their own destinies, not only in economic a f f a i r s , as 
already stated, but also in the po l i t i ca l sphere and that of international 
relations. 
^ The role of intra-regional co-operation 
Beyond any doubt, intra-regional co-operation o f fe rs the best poss ib i l i ty fo r 
reducing the r ig id i ty of the limits imposed by the external sector on the Central 
American economies. Today, more than ever, i t is necessary to press on with the 
programme which was begun in Central America nearly 30 years ago and which has l e f t 
such valuable f ru i t s and e^er ience . I t is necessary to do this not only in order 
to take advantage of the more dynamic impulses which could be expected from 
domestic demand (understood on a subregional b a s i s ) , but also in order to face up 
joint ly to certain speci f ic features of the subregion's relations with the rest 
of the world. This aspect has been dealt with on repeated occasions in the past 
in ECLA documents, but i t acquires fresh interest in the present circumstances. 
The aim would be, through intra-Central American co-operation, to increase 
the scanty room for action available to each of the individual countries of the 
subregion, in order thus to reduce the e f fects of the depression of the external 
sector. In the short term, the only e f fect ive way of expanding local demand seems 
to be that connected with co-operative e f fo r ts at the subregional level . There i s 
nothing new about such a procedure, since as lone ago as the 1950s i t was success-
fu l l y put-into practice in order to overcome the same obstacle, namely, the narrow 
.limits imposed on growth by international.demand. . Now, however, i t would be adop-
ted in a di f ferent situation. I f i t proved possible to increase intra-regional 
trade to the maximum, this would be f u l f i l l i n g the requirements, of the new style of 
development mentioned ea r l i e r by making more rational use of instal led capacity, 
reducing the influence of the adverse e f fects of external sector phenomena, 
increasing ef f ic iency -both fo r import substitution and fo r improving competitivity 
on international markets- and even taking joint advantage of the opportunities 
which the international market may continue to o f f e r . 
A l l this i s hindered at present by the barriers standing in the way of int ra -
regional trade. Clearly, i t would not be r ea l i s t i c to defend unrestricted free 
trade which did not take account of the greater or lesser importance of the goods 
being traded, but i t would be desirable at a l l events to keep restrictions to the 
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minimum and even to adopt mechanisms to give preference to reciprocal trade over 
s imi lar trade flows with th i rd countries. Only in this way could optimum use be 
made of the ins ta l l ed capacity of the subregion4 while even perhaps also promoting 
some new act iv i t ies based on subregional demand. For this purpose, the countries 
would need to adopt new procedures f o r financing the intra -Centra l American trade 
debit balances,6/ to do away with certa in - restr ict ions at present result ing from 
the exchánge controls adopted, and, in general terms, to give essent ia l ly the 
same treatment tó prodúcts or ig inat ing from any other Central American country as 
to those produced domestically. 
Furthermore, as alréady noted, regional co-operation i s the best way of 
improving the use made of the opportunities o f f e red by international trade, both 
in ordér to increase exports -on the bas i s , f o r example, of common marketing 
Systems- and in order to obtain addit ional external f inancing f o r projects and 
in i t i a t i ve s which are of interest of a l l . The strengthening of the Central American 
B a n k f o r Economic integration and of the machinery ava i lab le under the Central 
American Monetary Council are examples of some measures which would give r e a l force 
to this l a t t e r idea.7/ Another in i t i a t i ve which i s highly topica l at present- is 
that adopted by. the Central American governments in 1981 whereby they propose to 
approach the international f inanc ia l community j o in t l y to seek an increase in the 
t rans fe r of resources to the subregion. I t should be remembered that lack of 
int ra - reg iona l co-ordination in such a v i t a i area as external financing not only 
has a high opportunity cost - i f the po s s i b i l i t i e s f o r jo int mobilization of a f low 
of resource's which could not be obtained through individual negotiations are l o s t -
but also represents a r isk f o r the surv iva l of intra -Centra l American co-operation. 
I t has been noted that various actors on the international scene seem to be 
interested in providing co-operation to the Central American countries on a 
se lect ive ba s i s , with the exclusion of one or more countries from their programmes. 
This type of external co-operation, rather than uniting the Central American 
countries around a topic , woiild tend to separate them. 
There would be no question, of course, of seeking to promote instant 
integration of the economies of the region, since the obstacles standing in the 
way of such'an ambitious i n i t i a t i v e are we l l known. What i s sought f o r would be 
rather"to'make integration an e f f ec t i ve instrument f o r helping each country» 
in te rna l l y , to" adapt i t s e l f to the circumstances mentioned e a r l i e r . Making 
/ intra - reg ional 
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intra-regional co-operation one of the p i l l a r s of this e f f o r t would simply mean 
demanding, in the f i r s t instance, the preservation of the degree of economic 
interdependence already reached, while subsequently promoting jo int action to 
correct or rel ieve common problems. 
In this respect, some ideas could be put forward f o r reactivating intra -
regional economic co-operation in the short term on the basis of concrete action 
in s ix aspects: a) maintenance of the degree of economic interdependence already 
reached on the basis of reduction of the barriers erected to intra-regional trade 
and the adoption of f inancial machinery to ensure the smooth operation of such 
trade; b ) revision of the Central American common t a r i f f -on the basis of the 
technical advisory studies already prepared- to support the economic policy guide-
l ines already discussed ea r l i e r ; c) regional co-ordination of short-term policies 
such as exchange po l i c ies , or those connected with the processes of cycl ical 
adjustment; d) jo int act iv it ies v i s -à -v i s the international community, above a l l 
in order to increase the mobilization of external finance and improve the access of 
Central American products to the markets of third countries; e ) implementation of 
joint projects of multinational interest , sUch as fo r example the interconnection 
of e lectr ic i ty systems and co-operation in the exploitation of marine resources, 
and f ) strengthening of the Central American integration institutions so that they 
can help to carry out the pol ic ies in question, 
e ) The renewed role of the State 
In periods of intensive change, when i t i s necessary to transform styles of 
growth, modify consumption patterns and defend minimum levels of well-being of the 
masses, i t is essential in modern societies for the State to assume an active and 
leading role in the orientation of development, because otherwise society would 
become fragmented or i t would be necessary to pay excessively high socia l costs. 
Furthermore, the renewal of thé role of the State i s indispensable, regard-
less of differences of po l i t i c a l inclination, because of the need to mobilize the 
population in a participative e f f o r t without which development and social s tab i l i ty 
would be seriously imperil led, quite independently of the scope and objectives of 
the economic policy which each government may prefer and the greater or lesser 
pr ior i ty assigned to that pol icy. In other words, the need to adapt to new 
circumstances makes i t essential to bring economic policy into line with the 
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di f ferent demands. Likewise, i t i s the responsibil ity of the State to help to 
solve a series of confl icts which are bound to arise when formulating a sty le .o f 
development which is. qual itat ively di f ferent from the h istor ica l one. 
I t may seem an exaggeration to assert the need f o r the State to assume a 
more active role in the present c r i t i c a l situation. I f we analyse the features 
of this situation, however, we see. that the public sector s t i l l has a certain 
amount of room f o r action, and this should be ut i l i zed not only in order to 
cushion the.negative impact of .the c r i s i s , but also in order to orient i t s e f fects 
in a constructive manner. Thus, f o r example, the shortage of. foreign exchange 
makes it. necessary f o r someone to lay down an order of p r io r i t i es f o r the d i f ferent 
importing sectors and also to demand that the income received from exports rea l ly 
i s devoted to. essential inports . It. seems natural that this role should be 
assigned to the Central Banks and the government departments concerned with foreign 
trade. At a l l events, the need to rationalize the use of foreign exchange ca l ls 
f o r a greater intervention by the State than that which i s required in situations 
of greater normality as regards a country's external re lat ions. 
Furthermore, this shortage gives r ise to confl icts of interest and consequent 
pressures on the part of the various importing and exporting groups. The disputes 
which invariably take place in these situations can only be solved through the 
arbitration of a higher authority. In this respect, regardless of the combination 
of exchange, credit or f i s c a l formulas resorted to in order to face the c r i s i s , 
the shortage of resources does in fact sharpen the..struggle between the various 
interest groups, thus opening up -due to the fragmentation of demands- a larger 
space f o r action which the public sector can use to i ts advantage. 
Another qualitative change in the role played by the public sector derives 
from i t s smaller degree of dependence on international -trade as a direct source 
of f i s c a l revenue. The decisive role h istor ica l ly played by the exporting groups 
has been ref lected in the considerable weight-of foreign trade taxes in the public 
sector income, but this situation w i l l tend to change as.the external depression 
limits, the poss ib i l i t i e s of exporting and, accordingly, of importing too. As a 
resu l t , there w i l l be f inancia l problems unti l new domestic tax sources are found, 
but at the same time the vulnerabil ity of the State v i s - à -v i s certain pressure 
groups w i l l be .reduced.. 
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As already noted, nothing said in this study prejudices the degree of 
intentional!ty of public action in each country; the role of the "guiding State" 
i s considered to be perfectly coirpatible with a strong and vigorous private sector. 
On the other hand, i t i s desired to emphasize that there is an unavoidable need 
fo r the State to assume a more decisive role in order to orient the style of 
development in the l ight of certain objectives connected with the v i t a l common 
objective of overcoming the adverse factors currently predominating in the economies 
of the region and threatening their soc ia l and po l i t i c a l s t ab i l i t y . 
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f o r the region as a whole evolved as fol lows: in 1950, 1960 and 1978, respectively, 
i t was 18.5%, 16.7% and 23.5%, while in the sane years the coeff ic ient of imports 
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